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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PRETRIAL CUSTODIAL
IDENTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576
(1981)
In People v. Bustamante,I the California Supreme Court relied on the
state constitution2 to extend an accused's right to counsel to preindict-
ment 3 custodial lineups.'
Police officers arrested defendant on suspicion of robbery5 and other
crimes. 6 While defendant was in custody, a witness to the robbery pos-
itively identified him in a preindictment lineup. The witness reaffirmed
his identification at trial. Although defendant had requested counsel
1. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981).
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 states:
The defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial, to compel at-
tendance of witnesses in the defendant's behalf, to have the assistance of counsel for the
defendant's defense, to be personally present with counsel, and to be confronted with the
witnesses against the defendant. The Legislature may provide for the deposition of a
witness in the presence of the defendant and the defendant's counsel.
A series of recent California cases have interpreted this provision of the California Constitution
independently of United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting parallel provisions of the
federal constitution. See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762
(1980).
3. For purposes of this Comment, the term "preindictment" encompasses the period prior to
the filing of an information for felony prosecutions and the filing of a formal complaint in misde-
meanor prosecutions. The California Supreme Court in Bustamante similarly defined "preindict-
ment." 30 Cal. 3d at 91 n.1, 634 P.2d at 929, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 578. For statutes defining the use of
an indictment or complaint, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737, 740 (Deering 1982); FED. R.
CRuM. P. 3, 7. See also infra note 54.
4. Lineups, showups, and photograph displays are the custodial identification procedures
most frequently used in criminal investigations and prosecutions. In lineups and showups the
police present the suspect to the witness in person. See infra note 31 for a brief discussion of
lineup and showup procedures.
The photograph display procedure entails a presentation by the police of an array or "lineup"
of several photographs from which the witness identifies the suspect. For a discussion of the
dangers and constitutional safeguards of the various identification procedures, see Grano, Kirby,
Biggers & Ash, Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the
Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717 (1974). For current developments in case law on the right to
counsel at pretrial identification proceedings, see N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (1981);
Note, The Right to Counsel- Attachment Before Criminal Judicial Proceeding 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 810 (1979).
5. Defendant's appeal to the California Supreme Court focused solely on his robbery con-
viction. 30 Cal. 3d at 94, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
6, The State ultimately charged defendant with robbery, burglary, theft of a gun, receipt of
stolen property, possession of a firearm, possession of cocaine, and possession of concentrated
cannabis. Id at 93, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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prior to the lineup, none was provided until sometime after the identifi-
cation proceeding.7
At trial, the defense moved to exclude the witness's in-court identifi-
cation testimony from evidence, contending that it was based on a cus-
todial lineup during which the State violated defendant's right to
counsel." The trial court denied the motion and the jury subsequently
convicted defendant.' The defendant appealed the conviction ° on the
ground that the trial court erred in admitting the identification testi-
mony."1  In a plurality decision, the California Supreme Court12 re-
versed the conviction and held: Under the California Constitution, an
accused has a right to assistance of counsel at a preindictment lineup.' 3
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in
1791, guarantees criminal defendants the right to assistance of counsel
in federal prosecutions. 4 In Gideon v. Wainwright, 5 the United States
7. Id at 93, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The facts do not specify the point at
which the defendant first received counsel's assistance.
8. Id at 93, 634 P.2d at 930, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Prior to trial, the defense moved to
challenge the witness' lineup identification on the same grounds. The trial court denied the mo-
tion. Id The victim of the crime identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing, and re-
peated this identification at trial. The defendant did not object to the victim's identification
testimony, however, because there were no due process violations at the preliminary hearing iden-
tification. Id
9. Id In addition to the robbery conviction, the jury convicted defendant of receiving stolen
property, being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, possessing cocaine, and possessing concen-
trated cannabis. The jury acquitted defendant on the charges of burglary and theft of a stolen
gun. Id
10. People v. Bustamante, 110 Cal. App. 3d 981, 168 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1980).
11. The absence of counsel at a police lineup conducted after June 12, 1967, is reversible
error. Any suspect participating in a custodial lineup after the Supreme Court decisions of United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), is entitled to
counsel as a matter of right. See also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
12. The California Supreme Court sat en banc.
13. 30 Cal. 3d at 101-02, 634 P.2d at 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85.
14. In 1789 Congress passed the sixth amendment with almost no debate. Rachow, The Right
to Counsel- English and American Precedents, 11 WM. & MARY Q. 1, 21-26 (1954). The sixth
amendment reads in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, § 1.
Historically, the right to counsel was a procedural right available to defendants in selected crim-
inal and capital cases in England. See generally Note, An Historical Argumentfor the Right to
Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1018 n.99 (1964). Historians and coin-
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Supreme Court extended the specific guarantees of the sixth amend-
ment to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 6 In addition to the sixth and fourteenth amendment safe-
guards, criminal defendants at the state level are guaranteed the right
mentators on English law agree that a defendant prosecuted in a criminal trial for a felony or a
lesser wrong could receive legal assistance at pleadings of exception and at other intervals during
trial. Case law, statutes, and Yearbooks do not clearly define the stages of the criminal trial at
which the assistance of counsel attached.
The criminal defendant's right to counsel was preserved in common law England as an absolute
right. In sixteenth century England, however, courts began to limit the assignment of counsel by
establishing a distinction between fact and law on issues in a criminal trial. Courts began to
restrict the right to assistance of counsel to defendants pleading matters of law and denied advice
of counsel on issues or demonstrations of fact. Frequently courts narrowly construed what consti-
tuted questions of law, further limiting an accused's right to counsel. Jaeger, The Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogatiox The Aftermath of Escobedo, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 337, 347 n.57 (1965).
English courts denied defendants accused of treason the assistance of counsel. The use of wit-
nesses to introduce and illustrate factual issues developed concurrently with the right to counsel.
The courts maintained that witness confrontations and accusations of treasonous conduct were
matters of fact, not law, and thus the defendant was not entitled to counsel. See Russet's Case, 9
How. St. Tr. 577 (1683); Raleigh's Case, 1 How. St. Tr. 236 (1603). For a history of the develop-
ment of the right to counsel in common law England, see generally 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 244-72 (1883); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 607-20 (1936 ed.).
American courts did not adhere to the distinction articulated in English statutes and cases, and
thus, did not similarly restrict the right to counsel. Eleven of the thirteen colonies abolished the
dichotomic application of right to counsel either expressly or by implication in colonial statutory
provisions or constitutions granting the accused the right to the assistance of counsel: Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Note, supra, at 1030-31.
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. The Gideon Court stated: "[A] provision of the Bill of Rights which is fundamental and
essential to a fair trial is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at
342. The pertinent portion of the fourteenth amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Previously, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court recognized that indi-
gent defendants in capital cases were entitled to assistance of counsel at trial and at stages prior to
trial. The Court relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than the
sixth amendment right to counsel guarantee. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. In
1938, the Court applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to federal felony prosecutions.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Johnson Court, however, refused to extend the right
to counsel to state felony prosecutions. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court reaf-
firmed Johnson and held that the "due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment." Id at 461-62. The
Betts Court interpreted the due process clause narrowly and concluded that counsel's assistance at
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to counsel by parallel state constitutional provisions.17 Although the
state criminal prosecutions was a matter of state law and not a right protected by the federal
constitution. Id.
In 1963,'the Supreme Court overruled Bells in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. By granting indigent defendants the right to counsel in
all state criminal prosecutions, the Court in Gideon determined that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment fully incorporated the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel.
See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 514-19 (1980).
17. By 1789, the states had enacted statutes and ordinances expressly granting defendants the
assistance of counsel at criminal trials. North Carolina passed a statute providing that "every
person accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to counsel in all mat-
ters which may be necessary for his defense, as well to facts as to law .. " I N.C. REV. LAWS
225 (1777) (Iredell & Martin eds. 1804), cited in Note, supra note 14, at 1029. In addition, several
other states enacted similar provisions granting a defendant the right to counsel in felony as well
as misdemeanor prosecutions. See S.C. PUa. LAWS 25 (1731) (Grimke ed. 1790); 2 Z. SwiFT, A
SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 392, 398-99 (1796). Delaware, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania relied on the Penn Charter of 1701 to grant defendants the right to
counsel in criminal trials, explicitly extending the common law right: "[A]U criminals shall have
the same Privileges of Witness and Council as their Prosecutors." PENN CHARTER art. V (1701),
reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS AND ORGANIC LAWS
3079 (Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as THORPE]. See also DEL. CONST. art. XXIV (1776),
reprintedin 1 THORPE, supra, at 566; NJ. CONST. art. XVI (1776), reprintedin 5 THORPE, XUpra, at
2597. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont enacted constitutional provi-
sions that included the assistance of counsel as part of an accused's right to defend himself in a
criminal trial: "Every subject shall have a right. . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself,
and counsel." N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV (1784), reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra, at 2455. See also
MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (1780), reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1891; PENN. CONST. art. IX
(1776), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 3083; VT. CONST. ch. I, § 10 (1777), reprinted in 6 THORPE,
supra, at 3741. The Maryland Constitution of 1776 simply provided that defendants in criminalprosecutions are entitled to counsel. MD. CONST. art. XIX, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1688.
New York's constitution explicitly guaranteed that "in every trial, impeachment or indictment for
crimes or misdemeanors, the party impeached or indicted shall be allowed counsel, as in civil
actions." N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIV (1777), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 2635.
After the states ratified the United States Constitution, Georgia and Rhode Island drafted con-
stitutional provisions ensuring the accused the right to counsel. The Georgia constitution of 1798
provided that "no person shall be debarred from advocating or defending himself or counsel, or
both." GA. CONST. art. III, § 8, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra, at 799. Rhode Island modified its
Declaration of Rights to include a right to counsel provision similar to that of the sixth amend-
ment. R.I. REV. PUB. LAWS 80-81, § 6 (1798). See generally W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERICAN COURTS 18-22 (1955); Note, supra note 14, at 1055-57.
Today, 49 states have constitutional provisions entitling a defendant to the assistance of counsel
in criminal prosecutions. Alaska, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island and
West Virginia adopted wording similar to that of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused ... is entitled to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.") See also IOWA CONST. art 1, § 10; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20; MINN.
CONsT. art. 1, § 6; N.J. CONsT. art. 1, 1 10; R.I. CONST. art. 1 § 10; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14. In
37 states, the accused is entitled to be defended by counsel, by himself, or by both. See ALA.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15;
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. 1,
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right to counsel is firmly established in both state and federal jurisdic-
tions, courts disagree on the stage of the criminal proceeding at which
the right must attach.'8
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, 9 the Supreme Court recognized that
a defendant's right to a fair trial is contingent upon the extension of his
right to counsel beyond the boundaries of the trial itself.20 Although
the Powell Court specifically held that an indigent offender in a capital
case is entitled to a court-appointed attorney,2' the Court additionally
asserted that a defendant's right to counsel encompasses pretrial pro-
ceedings2 2 from arraingment to the beginning of trial.23 In reaching
§ 16; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. 1 § 8; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13; KAN. CONST. BILL
OF RTS., § 10; Ky. CONST. § 11; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MASS. CONST. § 13; MISS. CONST. art. 3,
§ 26; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 11; NEV.
CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 20; OR. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7, TENN. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 10; WASH. CONST.
art. 1, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 7; Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
Five state constitutions have notably different provisions for the right to counsel. GA. CONST.
art. 1, § 2-111 ("a defendant is to have the privilege and benefit of counsel'); HAWAII CONST. art.
I, § 11 ("right to assistance of counsel and, if the accused is indigent, the appointment of coun-
sel"); LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (same); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs., art. 21 ("an accused is to be
allowed counsel"); N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 23 ("the accused has the right to counsel").
In Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977), and People v. Jackson, 39 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d
22 (1974), the Alaska and Michigan Supreme Courts, by relying on their state constitutional provi-
sions, granted defendants counsel in state criminal prosecutions at stages in which the United
States Supreme Court, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), did not require counsel. See
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 20. See also supra notes 47-52 and accompa-
nying text.
Virginia is the only state that safeguards a criminal defendant's right to counsel by statute, see
VA. CODE §§ 19.2-157 to .2-163 (1950 & Supp. 1982), and by judicial interpretation, see, e.g.,
Timmons v. Peyton, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1966); Noe v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Va. 1970).
18. See infra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, defendants charged with rape did not have legal assistance
at their arraignment. On the morning of the trial the judge designated counsel to represent de-
fendants, although the record indicated the court-appointed attorney exerted at most casual efforts
in representing the defendants. The jury found defendants guilty of rape and sentenced them to
death. The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the state denied the defend-
ant a fair trial and right to counsel in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 52-56.
20. Id at 57.
21. Id at 71. The Powell Court held:
[lln a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiter-
acy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for
him as a necessary requisite of due process of law....
Id
22. Pretrial proceedings include arraignment, see, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
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this conclusion, the Court reasoned that these stages constitute a "criti-
cal period" of the adversary criminal process.24
Subsequently, in Hamilton v. Alabama,25 the Warren Court, relied on
the Powell opinion to hold that a defendant's right to counsel attaches
at "any critical stage" 26 in the criminal proceeding. Thereafter, state
and federal courts frequently applied the critical stage test to grant
counsel at arraignments,27 preliminary hearings, 28 and custodial
(1961); Salty v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972); McLean v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St. 2d 226, 208
N.E.2d 139 (1965), preliminary hearing, see, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United
States v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1970); State v. Owens, 391 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1965), and
custodial interrogation, see, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States ex
rel Dickerson, 430 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1970); State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551 (1965).
23. 287 U.S. at 57. Powell firmly established the necessity of counsel in a pretrial context:
"[The accused] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence." Id at 69. The Powell Court recognized that preparation of a
defendant's case during the pretrial stages would ultimately affect the defendant's right to a fair
trial. The delay or denial of appointing an attorney before trial would "amount to a denial of
effective and substantial aid in that regard." Id at 53. Later cases shared the Powell Court's
concern that an inadequately prepared defense would derrogate an accused's right to a fair trial.
See, eg., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961);
United States ex rel Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972).
24. The Supreme Court defined the "critical period" of criminal proceedings as "the time of
[the defendants'] arraignment and the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going
investigation and preparation [are] vitally important. . . . [Defendants are] as much entitled to
such aid during that period as at the trial itself." 287 U.S. at 57.
25. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
26. The Hamilton Court reasoned that what happens in a "critical stage of a criminal pro-
ceeding. . . may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then
and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic
purposes." Id at 54.
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test to determine whether a specific element in a
criminal prosecution constitutes a "critical stage:" whatever occurs at that particular stage must
affect the whole trial; jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair trial; and counsel's assistance
during that particular stage must have the capacity to help ensure procedural fairness to the de-
fendant. See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 16, at 521.
In Hamilton, the Court determined that arraignment constitutes a critical stage in Alabama
criminal proceedings. The Court reasoned that if the Alabama defendant fails to plead his de-
fenses at arraignment, they are waived for the remainder of the prosecution. ALA. CODE tit. 15,
§ 279 (1959 & Supp. 1973) (Alabama criminal code in effect at the time the Supreme Court
decided Hamilton).
27. See, e.g., Saltys v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972); Tucker v. State, 42 Ala. App.
174, 157 So. 2d 229 (1963); State v. Morrocco, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 568, 203 A.2d 161 (1964); People v.
Combs, 19 A.D.2d 639, 241 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1963); McLean v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St. 2d 226, 208
N.E.2d 139 (1965); Moorer v. State, 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 860 (1964).
28. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). See, e.g., White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963); United States v. Pate, 430 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1970); Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169
(4th Cir. 1970); Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 391 P.2d 542 (1964); People v. Morris, 30 111. 2d
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interrogations.2 9
In 1967, in United States v. Wade,3" the Supreme Court held that
postindictment lineups3t constituted a "critical stage" 32 in federal crim-
406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964); State v. Young, 194 Kan. 242, 398 P.2d 584 (1965); Commonwealth v.
O'Leary, 347 Mass. 387, 198 N.E.2d 403 (1964); State v. Owens, 391 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1965);
Rainsberger v. State, 81 Nev. 92, 399 P.2d 129 (1965); Sanders v. Cox, 74 N.M. 524, 395 P.2d 353,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); Pettit v. Rhay, 62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963); Sparkman
v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965).
29. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (right to counsel should "'apply to
indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.'" See also
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); United States ex rel Dickerson v. Rundel, 430 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1970);
Brown v. Crouse, 425 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1970); State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551 (1965);
People v. White, 233 Cal. App. 2d 765, 43 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1965); Harris v. State, 162 So. 2d 262
(Fla. 1964); Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 938
(1965); Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 140, 207 A.2d 643 (1965); State v. Lanzo, 44 N.J. 560, 210 A.2d
613 (1965); State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 398 P.2d 482 (1965); Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa.
437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688 (1965). See
generally Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1974); Note, The State Re-
sponses to Kirby v. United States, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 423.
30. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade, police arrested defendant for bank robbery after an indict-
ment had been returned. Prior to trial, federal agents directed defendant to participate in a lineup
with five or six other persons. Each member of the lineup wore strips of tape on their faces,
similar to those allegedly worn by the robbers, and were ordered to say "put the money in the
bag." Both witnesses positively identified defendant. Although the court had appointed counsel
to represent defendant, the attorney was not present at the pretrial lineup. At the trial, the wit-
nesses reconfirmed their positive identification of defendant. Id at 220.
31. Lineups and showups are the two types of custodial identification procedures. In a
showup, the police present the lone suspect to the witness for identification. Showups are either
arranged or accidental. N. SOBEL, supra note 4, at §§ 2-15 to -21. In a proper lineup or "identifi-
cation parade," police direct the suspect and five or six other persons of similar height, age, and
general appearance to line up or parade before witness. Lineups are most often used in cases of
robbery and rape. The lineup has become a means frequently employed by the police to "provide
them with fairly strong evidence of identity on which to proceed with their investigations and to
base an eventual prosecution." Williams & Hammelnan, Identfication Parades, Part 1, 1963
CRIM. L. REV. 479, 480. The Senate exemplified the popularity of eyewitness identification in its
committee hearings on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, when it de-
scribed eyewitness identification as "an essential prosecutorial tool." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1968), cited in Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal IdentiFcation: The
Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (1973). See generally N. SOBEL, supra
note 4; P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965).
The development of a defendant's rights in showup identification procedures has been similar
to that of the lineup except the courts usually assume a vigorous position against the use of a
showup as a custodial identification method. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973). For an overview of the development
of the rights of the accused in showups, see generally Grano, supra note 4; Pulaski, Neil v. Big-
gers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1097 (1974).
32. The Wade Court described the pretrial identification confrontation as critical because
Washington University Open Scholarship
294 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:287
inal prosecutions during which the accused must be afforded the right
to counsel.33 The Court reasoned that the dangers inherent in lineup
"the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." 388
U.S. at 224. The prejudicial effect that a pretrial custodial lineup has on the trial rests on the
"common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely
to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may. . . for all practical
purposes be determined there and then before the trial." Williams & Hammelman, supra note 31,
at 482.
The Court distinguished pretrial lineups from other "preparatory step[s] in the gathering of the
prosecutor's evidence." 388 U.S. at 227. The Court held counsel's presence to be unnecessary
during such evidence-gathering procedures as taking blood samples, see Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); fingerprinting, see Woods v. United States, 397 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1968);
taking photographs of the accused, see Sandoval v. State, 172 Colo. 383, 473 P.2d 722 (1970); and
physical examination and measurement of the accused, see State v. Hughes, 244 La. 774, 154 So.
2d 395 (1963). These identification methods, reasoned the Court, are based on scientific tech-
niques with limited variables; defense counsel could accurately reconstruct the given procedure at
trial and could effectively cross-examine witnesses about it. The Court concluded that "[these
procedures] are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that . . .[defendant's] counsel's
absence at such stages might derrogate from his right to a fair trial." 388 U.S. at 227-28.
33. Justice Brennan argued that the Court must "scrutinize any pretrial confrontation" to
assess whether defendant needs counsel to preserve his fifth and sixth amendment rights. 388 U.S.
at 227. The Court based its holding on the "principle that in addition to counsel's presence at
trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derrogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial." Id at 226.
In addition to extending the right to counsel at postindictment lineups, the Wade Court an-
nounced an exclusionary sanction to be imposed whenever a defendant's right to counsel at pre-
trial lineups has been violated. On cross-examination, the Wade defendant's counsel revealed that
the witnesses previously identified defendant at an uncounseled lineup. Defense counsel sought to
strike the in-court identification testimony of the bank witnesses, alleging that it was based on the
uncounseled lineups. Id. at 239-40. The Court held that identifications resulting from improperly
conducted pretrial lineups are inadmissible as evidence at trial. In addition, the Court held that
in-court identification testimony based on improper lineups could be excluded. In establishing the
exclusionary sanction, the Wade Court recognized that pretrial lineups are often used by the pros-
ecution to "crystallize" the witness' memory for later identification of defendant. The Court,
however, refused to establish an automatic exclusionary rule for in-court identifications based on
uncounseled lineups. Id at 240.
To lessen the severity of the exclusionary sanction, the Wade Court employed the independent
source test established by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963). 388 U.S.-at 240-41. The Court held that ifthe State could "establish by clear and convinc-
ing evidence" that the in-court identification was based on observations independent of the uncon-
stitutional lineups, then the in-court identification would be admitted into evidence. Id at 240.
The Supreme Court enumerated several factors useful in determining whether the in-court identi-
fication has a source independent of the illegal pretrial lineup, including:
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrep-
ancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the de-
fendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to
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identifications34 may seriously jeopardize the accused's right to a fair
trial.35 Counsel present at the identification proceeding 36 could detect
suggestive actions,37 avoid the risks of mistaken identification,3 8 and
consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the
conduct of the lineup.
Id at 241 (footnote omitted).
In a companion case, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Supreme Court automati-
cally excluded the in-court identification of eyewitnesses, determining that the identification was
the direct result of an improper pretrial lineup. Upon direct examination of the witnesses, the
State demonstrated that these witnesses had previously identified the defendant at a post-indict-
ment lineup at which counsel was absent. The Court determined that the in-court identification
was the "direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"
388 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). The Court in
Gilbert determined that evidence of an unconstitutional pretrial lineup identification is not admis-
sible in a state criminal trial.
The Court held further that evidence of an illegal pretrial lineup must be excluded per se from
the State's case-in-chief. In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that in such a situation the
uncounseled pretrial identification bolstered the in-court identification and the State should not be
afforded an opportunity to establish alternative sources for the irreparably tainted in-court identi-
fication. Id at 273.
34. Justice Brennan reasoned that lineups are inherently dangerous and threaten a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial:
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are
rife with instances of mistaken identification. . . . A major factor contributing to the
high incidence of miscarriage of'justice from mistaken identification has been the degree
of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to
witnesses for pretrial identification ....
Moreover,
[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at
the lineup, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of
identity may . . . for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the
trial.
388 U.S. at 228-29 (footnote omitted).
35. See supra notes 23 & 26.
36. The presence of counsel at lineups would eliminate or reduce the risks of suggestion and
abuse, ensure defendant's right to confront his accusors, and protect defendant's right to a fair
trial by enabling counsel to effectively cross-examine witnesses and reconstruct the lineup proce-
dure in court. N. SOBEL, supra note 4, at §§ 2-21 to -24. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
229-38 (1967); Pointer v. State, 380 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1965); Levine & Tapp, supra note 31, at
1081-87, 1124-25; Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, supra note 29, at 399; Note, The State Re-
sponses to Kirby v. United States, supra note 29, at 423. For a discussion on the limited and
ineffective role performed by counsel at lineups, see Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969
(1977).
37. Factors contributing to the suggestive nature of lineups include: the witness' knowledge
that one of the persons in the lineup is the suspect; the intentional contrast of physical characteris-
tics among the participants in the lineup; the witness' familiarity with participants in the lineup;
knowledge possessed by the other participants of who the suspect is; distinctive placement of the
suspect in the line; and distinctive clothing worn by the suspect. Williams & Hammelman, supra
note 31, at 486-90. 4ccord Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (after hearing prosecution's
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permit informed challenges to witnesses in court. 9  In a companion
case, Gilbert v. California,4 ° the Court extended the Wade holding to
state prosecutions.41  The majorities in Wade and in Gilbert, however,
failed to determine the earliest pretrial stage at which the right could
attach.42  Absent such guidance, many state and federal courts con-
strued Wade and Gilbert liberally,43 granting the defendant a right to
evidence, police told victim she was going to see her assailant before she positively identified him);
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (accused placed in lineup where he was only tall man
wearing a hat); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (witnesses communicated with each
other before and during lineup); Saltys v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972) (witness saw photo
of suspect before observing suspect in lineup). The informality of postarrest, pretrial lineup iden-
tifications minimizes the use of procedural safeguards that diminish suggestion. See United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); United States v. Roth, 430 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1021 (1971); Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See generally N. SOBEL,
supra note 4; P. WALL, supra note 31.
38. Scientists have conducted experiments to evaluate the reliability of lineup identifications.
Although performed under favorable conditions, all experiments demonstrated a high degree of
inaccuracy associated with eyewitness identification. See Brown, An Experience in Identification
Testimony, 25 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1935); Chenoweth, Police Training
Investigates the Fallibility of the Eye Witness, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & P.S. 378 (1960);
Vickery & Brooks, Time-Spaced Reporting of a "Crime" Witnessed by College Girls, 29 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & P.S. 371 (1938).
39. Accurate recollection of the custodial lineup at trial would enable the defense to conduct
a "meaningful cross-examination" of the eyewitness, safeguarding defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him. 388 U.S. at 232, 235.
40. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
41. Id at 270. See supra note 33. A second preindictment identification case decided in the
same term was Stbvall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 298 (1967). The Court in Stovall noted that the Wade-
Gilbert decisions could not be applied retroactively and established an alternate due process chal-
lenge. The accused could attack the pretrial lineup on the ground that "the confrontation ... was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was de-
nied due process of law." Id at 301-02. Since Stovall, the Supreme Court has employed the due
process standard to determine whether the pretrial identification procedure used was "so imper-
missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (photograph identification). Accord Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (photographic identification); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973) (same); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (showup); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(police station showup); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (witness confronted the suspect
prior to corporeal lineup); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1968) (photographic identification).
42. Although defendant in Wade was identified during a postindictment lineup, 388 U.S. at
237, the Court did not indicate that counsers assistance could only attach at this stage. Id at 226-
39. Justice Black objected to the majority's equivocal criterion and emphasized that a defendant is
entitled to counsel at identification "regardless of when the identification occurs, in time or place,
and whether before or after indictment or information." 1d at 251 (Black, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
43. See, ag., People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); State v.
Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215 So. 2d 838 (1968), vacated, Johnson v. Louisiana, 408 U.S. 932 (1972);
Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356 Mass. 591,
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counsel at preindictment and preinformation lineups.'
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois45 restricted
the Wade-Gilbert rule46 and limited attachment of the right to counsel
to postindictment custodial lineups.4 7 In a plurality opinion, the Court
held that because any procedure occurring before the "initiation of ad-
versary judicial criminal proceedings"48 was not critical,49 no right to
counsel could then attach. The Court maintained that the fifth amend-
254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970); Thompson
v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84,
161 S.E.2d 581 (1968), cer. denied, 396 U.S. 934 (1969); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265
N.E.2d 327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 400 U.S.
919 (1970); In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970); Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842
(Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P.2d 943 (1969); Hayes v. State, 46
Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970). The California Supreme Court in People v. Fowler
concluded:
IT]he Wade and Gilbert rules are not limited in their application to lineups occurring
after indictment .... The presence or absence of those conditions attendant upon line-
ups which induced the high court to term such proceedings 'a critical stage of the prose-
cution' at which the right to counsel attaches is certainly not dependent upon the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of proceedings formally binding a defendant over for trial.
I Cal. 3d 335, 342, 461 P.2d 643, 648-49, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368-69 (1969).
Several states declined to apply the Wade-Gilbert ruling to preindictment or preinformation
lineups. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d
382 (Fla. 1969); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210
Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
44. Most of the United States circuit courts found no distinction between lineups held before
or after filing an indictment, information, or complaint. These courts held that the right to coun-
sel should attach at either stage. See, eg., Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); Virgin Islands v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (Ist Cir. 1970); United
States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970); United States v.
Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970); United States v. Broadhead, 413
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935
(5th Cir. 1968).
45. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
46. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
47. In the absence of defendant's counsel, witnesses positively identified defendant in a police
station showup before the State filed a complaint or an indictment against him. The Kirby Court
held that Wade and Gilbert did not apply to preindictment confrontations. Thus, the witness's in-
court identification, although it was based on a preindictment showup, was admissible because it
did not violate defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 406 U.S. at 684-87, 690-91.
48. The Court maintained that the "initiation of judicial criminal proceedings.. . is the
starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the gov-
ernment has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government
and defendant have solidified." Id at 689. Accordingly, the Kirby Court held any proceeding that
occurred before filing a formal charge to be antecedent to the initiation of judicial criminal pro-
ceedings.
The dissent in Kirby argued that the Court's distinction between preindictment and postindict-
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ment's due process guarantee5" affords the accused adequate protection
against the risks5' surrounding pretrial confrontations conducted prior
to the formal commencement of prosecution proceedings. 2
ment identification proceedings was irrelevant. Reemphasizing the Wade Court's reasoning, Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, argued that:
Wade did not require the presence of counsel at pretrial confrontations for identification
purposes simply on the basis of an abstract consideration of the words 'criminal prosecu-
tions' in the sixth amendment. Counsel is required at those confrontations because [ofi
'the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestability inherent in the
context of the pretrial identification.'
Id at 696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Grano, supra note 4, at 725-30; Note, The Pretrial
Right to Counsel, supra note 29, at 410-13; Note, The State Responses to Kirby v. United States,
supra note 29, at 432-34.
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977), modified Kirby's holding
that the right to counsel could attach only after filing an indictment or information. In Moore, the
Supreme Court clarified the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings" standard es-
tablished in Kirby by determining that not only the return of an indictment but also the filing of a
complaint marks the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings. Id at 228. In Moore,
the suspect participated in a postcharge, preindictment identification showup without the assist-
ance of counsel. The Court held the identification confrontation unconstitutional. Although the
State had not yet filed a formal indictment, the filing of a complaint was sufficient to commence
judicial criminal proceedings under Illinois law. Id See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111 (1975).
49. 406 U.S. at 690. See supra notes 26 & 32 and accompanying text.
50. The pertinent text of the fifth amendment reads: "No person shall be ... compelled in
any criminal case to be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
In offering the accused the alternative due process safeguard, the Court adhered to the rationale
presented in Stovall v. Denno, 368 U.S. 298 (1967).
51. See supra notes 34-35 & 37-38.
52. The dissent in Kirby contended that the distinction between investigatory procedures oc-
curring before and those occurring after the commencement of adversary proceedings "exalts
form over substance." 406 U.S. at 697-99. The dissent argued that once the accused is in the
custody of the police "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way...
our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences." Id at 698 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966)).
The California Supreme Court also criticized the Kirby preindictment-postindictment
dichotomy:
[W]e think it clear that the establishment of the date of formal accusation as the time
wherein the right to counsel at lineup attaches could only lead to a situation wherein
substantially all lineups would be conducted prior to indictment or information. We
cannot reasonably suppose that the high court.., would announce a rule so susceptible
of emasculation by avoidance.
People v. Fowler, I Cal. 3d 335, 344, 461 P.2d 643, 650, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (1969).
Opponents of Kirby assert that defendants especially need the assistance of counsel at preindict-
ment identification proceedings. They argue that this is the stage when misidentification, which
could result in the conviction of innocent persons at trial, is most likely to occur. N. SOBEL, supra
note 4, at §§ 2-10 to -11; Williams & Hammelman, supra note 31, at 83.
Police and prosecutors, on the other hand, welcomed the Kirby limitation. They believed that
limiting the scope of the right to counsel to postindictment proceedings would expedite criminal
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A majority of state courts have adopted Kirby,53 using the "com-
mencement of formal judicial proceedings"54 standard as a guideline
for determining when to extend to a defendant his sixth amendment
right to counsel. A few states, 55 however, refuse to conform to the
Supreme Court restriction and continue to apply Wade's critical stage
rationale. 6 These states circumvent the limitation imposed by Kirby
and extend the right to counsel to preindictment custodial lineups by
investigations. See N. SOBEL, supra note 4, at §§2-10 to -11; Comment, The Right to Counsel at
Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 830, 839 (1969).
53. See, eg., State v. Taylor, 109 Ariz. 518, 514 F.2d 439 (1973); State v. Bragg, 371 So. 2d
1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Hunt v. Hopper, 232 Ga. 53, 205 S.E.2d 303 (1974); State v.
Sadler, 95 Idaho 524, 511 P.2d 806 (1973); Winston v. State, 263 Ind. 8, 323 N.E.2d 228 (1975);
Williamson v. State, 201 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1972); State v. Rudolph, 332 So. 2d 806 (La.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); State v. Rowe, 314 A.2d 407 (Me. 1974); Jackson v. State, 17 Md.
App. 167, 300 A.2d 430 (1973); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 363 Mass. 102, 292 N.E.2d 694 (1973);
State v. Carey, 296 Minn. 214, 207 N.W.2d 529 (1973); Hobson v. State, 285 So. 2d 464 (Miss.
1973); Reed v. Warden, 89 Nev. 141, 508 P.2d 2 (1973); Stewart v. State, 509 P.2d 1402 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1973); State v. Delahunt, 401 A.2d 1261 (R.I. 1979); State v. McLeod, 260 S.C. 445,
196 S.E.2d 645 (1973). Missouri and Wisconsin have adhered to Kirby but have criticized its
reasoning. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Taylor, 60 Wis.
2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
The New York Supreme Court articulated specific exceptions to the Kirby holding. See People
v. Banks, 73 A.D.2d 907,424 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1980) (suspect retained counsel on prior charges; right
to counsel on new charges automatically attaches); People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d
819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977) (same). Contra State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 602 P.2d 1344 (1979)
(the right to counsel does not attach to preindictment lineups on new charges when suspect de-
tamined on prior charge); State v. Montgomery, 596 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (same); State
v. Puckett, 46 N.C. App. 719, 266 S.E.2d 48, appeal dismissed, 270 S.E.2d 115 (N.C. 1980) (al-
though defendant in police custody on another charge, absence of counsel at preindictment lineup
on new charge was not unconstitutional per se). In addition, both New York and Alabama grant
the accused the right to the assistance of counsel at a postarrest, preindictment identification if the
accused has already retained counsel. See Sparks v. State, 376 So. 2d 834 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979);
People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 320 N.E.2d 625, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1974).
54. The Illinois criminal code provides: "When authorized by law, a prosecution may be
commenced by: (a) a complaint, (b) an information, (c) an indictment." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 111-1 (1980).
The documents of indictment and information are commonly used to charge a suspect with a
felony; a complaint is most often used to charge a suspect with a misdemeanor. The type of
charging document employed in particular circumstances will vary and depend upon the criminal
offense and the state. The term "formal charges" generally refers to an indictment, information,
or complaint. A majority of state criminal codes contain provisions similar to those in the Illinois
criminal code.
55. Alaska, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and now California reject the Kirby approach. See in-
fra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
56. See Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 642 (Alaska 1977); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 339,
217 N.W.2d 22, 27-28 (1974); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 98-99, 634 P.2d 927, 933-34,
177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582-83 (1981); People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 171-72, 205 N.W.2d 461,
467-68 (1973); Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351, 361 (1974) (Eagen, J., concurring).
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broadly interpreting the Kirby definition of "adversary criminal pro-
ceedings"57 or by relying on the state constitutional provisions estab-
lishing the right to counsel.5 8
In People v. Bustamante,59 California became the third state to cir-
cumvent the Kirby v. Illinois restriction and to extend the right to coun-
"sel to preindictment lineups60  by relying on a parallel state
constitutional guarantee.6 t Writing for the majority, Justice Tobriner
initially considered earlier United States Supreme Court decisions for
guidance.62 He noted, however, that California courts are not bound
by these decisions in interpreting provisions of the California
Constitution.63
Justice Tobriner proceeded to apply the critical stage standard, set
forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade,64 to determine
whether the section of the California Constitution that guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to counsel extends to a pretrial lineup. 5
He asserted that because a properly conducted lineup is invaluable in
augmenting the reliability of identification testimony and because mis-
taken identifications substantially influence the outcome of the trial, the
pretrial lineup constitutes a "critical stage" in a criminal proceeding.66
Justice Tobriner held that a fairly conducted lineup is essential to the
protection of innocent defendants67 and that although the defense
counsel plays a limited role during this proceeding, his presence helps
57. The court in Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974), for example, deter-
mined that arrest signaled the commencement ofjudicial proceedings in Pennsylvania. Id at 353.
58. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217
N.W.2d 22 (1974). The Supreme Court of Alaska declared that it "is not limited by decisions of
the United States Supreme Court or by the United States Constitution when interpreting the state
constitution. The Alaska Constitution may have broader safeguards than the minimum federal
standards." 558 P.2d at 641. The Michigan Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning. 391 Mich.
at 337-38, 217 N.W.2d at 27.
59. 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981).
60. See supra notes 4 & 31.
61. See supra note 2.
62. Justices Mosk, Newman and Weiner joined in the majority opinion. Justice Tobriner
presented a state constitutional argument similar to that espoused by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977). See supra note 58.
63. 30 Cal. 3d at 97, 634 P.2d at 932, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
64. 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). For a discussion of Wade, see supra notes 30-39 and accompa-
nying text.
65. 30 Cal. 3d at 98-102, 634 P.2d at 933-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 582-85.
66. Id
67. Id at 99, 634 P.2d at 934, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
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to safeguard a defendant's rights.68
After concluding that a defendant's right to counsel extends to pre-
trial lineups, 69 Justice Tobriner considered the question of whether the
right should be limited to postindictment lineups.70 He condemned the
Supreme Court's restriction of the right to counsel to postindictment
proceedings in Kirby as "wholly unrealistic,"'7 I stating that a defendant
frequently requires counsel's assistance prior to the filing of formal
charges.72 Justice Tobriner further maintained that any burden on po-
lice investigations resulting from an extension of the right to counsel to
preindictment lineups is not substantial enough to deny the defendant
this safeguard.73 In support of this contention, he noted that during the
five years between Wade and Kirby, California criminal defendants
were provided with counsel at preindictment lineups with no significant
68. Id Justice Tobriner explained that
[a] requirement for counsel at lineups encourages the police to adopt regulations to en-
sure the fairness of the lineups. . . and to follow those regulations. . . . The attorney
may detect inadvertent suggestive actions not within the scope of prostective regulations.
Finally, counsel's observations will help him to prepare for cross-examination of the
identifying witness and for argument at trial.
Id
69. Id at 100, 634 P.2d at 934-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84. Justice Tobriner contended that
"[slince the presence of counsel can contribute significantly to the protection of his client from
misidentification, defendant is entitled to have counsel present to assist him at that critical junc-
ture." Id
70. Id at 101-02, 634 P.2d at 935-36, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85.
71. Id at 100, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
72. Id Justice Tobriner reasoned that limiting the attachment of the right to counsel to pos-
tindictment proceeding as advocated in Kirby would render defendant's right to counsel ineffec-
tive at later stages in the criminal process:
[T]o limit the right to counsel at a lineup to postindictment lineups would as a practical
matter nullify that right. 'The defendant who most needs protection from erroneous
identification is one who is implicated primarily or solely by eyewitness testimony. Yet,
because of this lack of noneyewitness evidence, an identification of the defendant in a
lineup or showup would be necessary to justify formal charges or arraignment. Conse-
quently, the crucial confrontation necessarily will be held before the initiation of formal
judicial proceedings when the defendant can be deprived of counsel. Thus Kirby
removes the protective effects of counsel's presence precisely when the danger of convict-
ing an innocent defendant upon a mistaken identification is greatest. furthermore, after
Kirby, the policy may defeat the aims of Wade and Gilbert in any case simply by delay-
ing formal charges and holding the lineup in the absence of defense counsel.'
Id at 101, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (quoting Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You?
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness IdentyFfcation, 29 STAN. L. REV.
969, 996 (1977)). Thus, the majority believed that the formalistic approach of "initiation of adver-
sary judicial proceedings" espoused in Kirby can be easily circumvented by police, effectively
defeating the safeguard of the right to counsel.
73. Id at 101, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
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impediment on police investigations.74 The Bustamante majority con-
cluded that the California Constitution guarantees the criminally ac-
cused the right to assistance of counsel at preindictment custodial
lineups. 75
Writing for the concurrence,76 Chief Justice Bird" disagreed with
the court's observation in dictum that counsel's role at a lineup is "lim-
ited." 78 Rather, she maintained that counsel must assume an active
role at pretrial lineups not only to ensure that proper procedures are
used and to provide effective assistance, but also to protect the constitu-
tional right of the defendant to meaningful cross-examination of wit-
nesses at trial.79
Justice Richardson, the sole dissenter, disapproved of the majority's
"selective reliance" on the state constitution to supersede the limita-
tions established by the United States Supreme Court. 0 He endorsed
74. Id The majority noted, however, that the absence of counsel at a pretrial identification
proceeding would be excusable under exigent circumstances "[ilf conditions require immediate
identification without even minimal delay, or if counsel cannot be present within a reasonable
time, such exigent circumstances will justify proceeding without counsel." Id at 101-02, 634 P.2d
at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (footnote omitted).
75. The court held further that its decision would render the in-court identification testimony
in question inadmissible unless the trial court, on remand, found that the testimony rested on a
"basis independent from and untainted by the improper lineup." Id at 103, 634 P.2d at 936, 177
Cal. Rptr. at 585.
The Bustamante court also considered the retroactive effect of its holding. Recognizing that
prior to Bustamante, police, prosecutors and courts did not extend the right to counsel to pre-
indictment lineups, the court declined to apply the decision retroactively. Moreover, the court
believed that the decision denying retroactive application would avoid disruption of prior investi-
gations and pending prosecutions. Id at 102, 634 P.2d at 936, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 583 P.2d 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1978), controlled with.respect to
Bustamante's appeal. Cook held that decisions overruling earlier rulings on criminal procedure
should apply to the individual who raised the procedural issue on appeal. 30 Cal. 3d at 102, 634
P.2d at 936, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
76. Id at 104-06, 634 P.2d at 937-38, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 586-88.
77. Justice Staniforth joined in the concurring opinion. Id
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id at 109, 634 P.2d at 940, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (citing People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting)). Justice Richardson
believed that personal disagreement among a majority of members of a state court is insufficient
reason to reject a United States Supreme Court ruling. He argued that, absent unique or distin-
guishing characteristics of a state case, there is no justification for the state supreme court to
depart from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a constitutional provision that is
virtually identical to the state constitutional provision. 16 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 545 P.2d at 283-84,
127 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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the rationale set forth by the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois,81 con-
tending that the application of the critical stage test should be restricted
to "criminal prosecutions. ' 82  Justice Richardson also adopted the
Kirby Court's argument that the filing of formal charges signals the
commencement of the adversarial criminal justice process.83 Relying
on Kirby's distinction between the investigation and prosecution stages
of a criminal proceeding, the dissent asserted that lineups conducted
during custodial investigations are not "critical" merely because of
their potential unreliability.84 Justice Richardson reasoned that the
due process standard of the fourteenth amendment affords the accused
adequate protection against abuses of identification procedures.8 5
In addition, Justice Richardson maintained that counsel's role at a
lineup is passive and that such presence does not provide the accused
with absolute protection against mistaken identification or suggestive-
ness.8 6 He argued that an extension of the right to counsel during pre-
indictment lineups would only impose unnecessary burdens and delays
on police investigations 7 and concluded that the majority's rejection of
Kirby was "unnecessary and unwise." 88
The Bustamante Court correctly concluded that counsel's presence at
all pretrial lineups is essential to a complete and effective defense of the
criminally accused. 89 The highly prejudicial impact that an improperly
conducted preindictment lineup could have on a criminally accused at
trial, in terms of both the possibility of mistaken identification 90 and
the deprivation of effective cross-examination, 91 certainly renders this
81. 30 Cal. 3d at 106, 634 P.2d at 938, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
82. Id at 107, 634 P.2d at 938, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
83. Id at 106-07, 634 P.2d at 938, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
84. Id
85. Id at 107-08, 634 P.2d at 939, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 588. Justice Richardson contended that:
any abuse of identification procedures, including improperly suggestive lineups, may be
fully reviewed under applicable due process standards. . . . As stressed by the high
court in Kirby, 'Stovall strikes the appropriate constitutional balance between the right of
a suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures and the interest of society in the
prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime.'
Id
86. Id at 108-09, 634 P.2d at 939-40, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (citations omitted).
87. Justice Tobriner maintained that "harried police personnel busily engaged in an ongoing
investigation are further shackled because they may well be unable accurately to determine
whether or not a true 'exigency' exists." l1d at 108-09, 634 P.2d at 940, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
88. Id at 109, 634 P.2d at 940, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
89. See id at 99-101, 634 P.2d at 934-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
90. See supra notes 34, 37, 38 & 71-72 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 36, 39, 68-69 & 71-72 and accompanying text.
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stage of the criminal prosecution "critical." In People v. Bus/amante
the California Supreme Court recognized that identical risks of mis-
identification and suggestion are present in all custodial lineups,
whether they are conducted before or after the filing of formal
charges.92 As the Bus/amante majority concluded, the imposition of
the Kirby restriction would "exalt form over substance" 93 and effec-
tively deny the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, as well
as his right to counsel.94
The dissent's distinction between investigatory and adversary judi-
cial proceedings, adopted from Kirby v. Illinois,95 suggests that the dan-
gers inherent in pretrial identification procedures96 threaten a
defendant's right to a fair trial only when the identification occurs after
the filing of formal charges.97 Unless the state decides not to prosecute,
however, the effect of an improperly conducted preindictment lineup is
as detrimental to the defendant at trial as is an improperly conducted
postindictment lineup.98 In addition, the due process safeguard advo-
cated in Kirby9 9 and reiterated in Justice Richardson's dissent in Busta-
mante 100 provides an inadequate substitute for the presence of counsel
at a preindictment lineup. Defense counsel's absence during pretrial
identification proceedings renders him unable to make informed chal-
lenges to the credibility and admissibility of the State's identification
evidence at trial.' 0 '
The California Supreme Court's reliance on its state constitution as
an independent source granting the right to counsel represents a valid
exercise of its authority and is not without precedent.'0 2 The Supreme
Courts of Alaska'03 and Michigan,"° for example, have successfully
relied on state constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel to cir-
92. 30 Cal. 3d at 100-01, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
93. Id See supra note 52.
94. 30 Cal. 3d at 100-01, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
95. Id at 106-08, 634 P.2d at 938-39, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
96. Id See supra notes 34-38 & 72 and accompanying text.
97. 30 Cal. 3d at 106-08, 634 P.2d at 938-39, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
98. id at 100-01, 634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
99. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 36-39 & 68 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
103. Id
104. Id
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cumvent the Kirby holding."°5
The Kirby holding, advocated in a majority of jurisdictions,1 0 6 ig-
nores the substantial risks of prejudice to a defendant resulting from
improperly conducted preindictment identification procedures.10 7 The
assumption that the dangers inherent in custodial lineups become via-
ble only after the commencement of formal judicial proceedings is
without merit. The presence of counsel during a pretrial lineup--
whether conducted before or after the filing an indictment or com-
plaint-is essential to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.
JA.S.
105. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 34-39, 66-67 & 71-72 and accompanying text.
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